Why dictators veto: legislation, legitimation and control in Kazakhstan and Russia

Why do authoritarian presidents still use their legislative power? Although recent studies have argued that authoritarian legislatures are more than “rubberstamps” and can serve as arenas for elite bargaining over policy, there is no evidence that legislators would pass bills that go against presidential preferences. This article investigates this apparent paradox and proposes a theoretical framework to explain presidential activism in authoritarian regimes. It argues that any bills that contravene constraints on policy-making set by the president should generally be stopped or amended by other actors loyal to the regime. Thus, presidents will rather use their veto (1) to protect the regime’s output legitimacy and stability, and/or (2) to reinforce their power vis-à-vis other actors. The argument is tested using two case studies of veto use in Kazakhstan and Russia over the last 10 years. The analysis supports the propositions of the theoretical framework and furthermore highlights the potential use of vetoes as a means of distraction, particularly in relation to international audiences. The article extends research on presidential veto power to authoritarian regimes and its findings contribute to the growing literature on the activities of authoritarian legislatures

Czech Social Reform/Non-reform: Routes, Actors and Problems

In this contribution, the author first considers the characteristics of the Czechoslovak communist welfare state and its theoretical alternatives. Throughout the reform process, dependency on both corporatist and socialist regimes won out, while residualist efforts were promoted in the beginning, but were later held back. The author then considers the possible actors involved in social reforms. In this respect, when proceeding from a general to a more concrete level, thought should first be devoted to the social classes and their ideologies, and second to political parties and their leaders. The author goes on to summarise the particular problems and traps in individual sections of the Czech social system. While no objection to decent standards of social protection and health care could be raised, the poor efficiency of their achievement should evoke concern. The author concludes by reflecting on the possible specificities of Czech social reform in comparison with the other countries undergoing reform and the EU. The current lethargy of the Czech welfare system corresponds to a “frozen edifice”, just as in most Western countries. However, such stagnation is apparently acceptable to both the politicians (who mask it in reformist rhetoric) and the population (which learned to master taking advantage of the generous welfare state) and thus is basically sustainable in the long run.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40037/3/wp651.pd

The comitology game: European policymaking with parliamentary involvement

This paper discusses institutional reforms that might strengthen the role of the European Parliament in the policymaking process of the European Union. Using simple game theory, the paper analyzes the working properties of the different implementation procedures that are known as ‘comitology’. The Council of the European Union employs these procedures when it delegates some of its policymaking power to the Commission as part of Union legislation. We show how the balance of power is determined by the current comitology procedures, and how this balance would change if the role of the European Parliament were strengthened in the comitology game

The nested games of the UK’s EU referendum: ruptures, reconfigurations and lessons for Europe

The 2016 decision by the United Kingdom to withdraw from the European Union was a seminal one for both parties. In this special issue, we consider the extent to which the inter-penetration of the national and the European arenas produced significant opportunities for recasting political action. The nesting of these two levels matters firstly in allowing for the politicisation and mobilisation of domestic actors around European issues and secondly in explaining why seemingly sub-optimal or counter-productive actions are taken. The tensions this generated reached a critical juncture with the referendum, a rupture that highlights the extent to which a nominally second-order vote can have fundamental impacts on the first order’s structure and preferences. Bringing together scholars from a wide range of approaches and covering various aspects of the Brexit process, this special issue offers a significant contribution to improving our understanding of an event that will shape British and European politics for a generation

Corruption and bicameral reforms

During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives

Budget institutions and taxation

While a number of different studies have explored the effects of budgetary procedures and the centralization of the budget process on government debt, deficits and spending, few of them have explored whether such fiscal institutions matter for public revenue. This article argues that centralizing the budget process raises the levels of taxation by limiting the ability of individual government officials to veto tax increases in line with common-pool-problem arguments regarding public finances. Using detailed data on budgetary procedures from 15 EU countries, the empirical analysis shows that greater centralization of the budget process increases taxation as a share of GDP and that both the type of budget centralization and level of government fractionalization matter for the size of this effect. The results suggest that further centralizing the budget process limits government debt and deficits by increasing public revenues as well as constraining public spending

The Politics of Evidence Use in Health Policy Making in Germany-the Case of Regulating Hospital Minimum Volumes.

This article examines the role of scientific evidence in informing health policy decisions in Germany, using minimum volumes policy as a case study. It argues that scientific evidence was used strategically at various stages of the policy process both by individual corporatist actors and by the Federal Joint Committee as the regulator. Minimum volumes regulation was inspired by scientific evidence suggesting a positive relationship between service volume and patient outcomes for complex surgical interventions. Federal legislation was introduced in 2002 to delegate the selection of services and the setting of volumes to corporatist decision makers. Yet, despite being represented in the Federal Joint Committee, hospitals affected by its decisions took the Committee to court to seek legal redress and prevent policy implementation. Evidence has been key to support, and challenge, decisions about minimum volumes, including in court. The analysis of the role of scientific evidence in minimum volumes regulation in Germany highlights the dynamic relationship between evidence use and the political and institutional context of health policy making, which in this case is characterized by the legislative nature of policy making, corporatism, and the role of the judiciary in reviewing policy decisions